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Quantum cryptographic protocols solve the longstanding problem of distributing a shared secret
string to two distant users by typically making use of one-way quantum channel. However, alterna-
tive protocols exploiting two-way quantum channel have been proposed for the same goal and with
potential advantages. Here we overview a security proof for two-way quantum key distribution pro-
tocols, against the most general eavesdropping attack, that utilize an entropic uncertainty relation.
Then, by resorting to the ‘smooth’ version of involved entropies, we extend such a proof to the case
of finite key size. The results will be compared to those available for one-way protocols showing
some advantages.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ta, 89.70.Cf
I. INTRODUCTION
Two-way quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes have
evolved from a theoretic framework in the context of de-
terministic schemes to experimental realizations for QKD
purposes [1]. The protocol is described by a qubit being
sent from one party, say, Bob to another, Alice for her en-
coding before being sent back to him for a measurement
to ascertain Alice’s encoding. Standing in stark contrast
to BB84 like prepare and measure schemes where infor-
mation encoding is simply in the choice of states and
bases of qubits to be sent from the encoding party to the
receiver [2], the case for two-way QKDs is really in the
choice of unitary transformations by an encoding party
that would act on the qubits traveling to and fro be-
tween the legitimate parties. This naturally makes use
of the quantum channel twice. Another peculiarity of the
above-mentioned two-way protocols would be how its se-
curity is to be ensured. The protocols’ runs are divided
into two modes, namely the encoding mode (EM) where
message encoded by Alice is followed by measurements
by Bob for decoding purposes and the control mode (CM)
where Alice would make projective measurements in ran-
domly selected bases such that when the bases coincide
with Bob’s then errors can be ascertained. The distribu-
tion of the EM and CM would be determined by a factor
c, with 0 < c < 1, i.e. the probability of Alice randomly
choosing an EM.
However, despite its early introduction in 2002 [4], and
varying versions that followed, it was only about a decade
later that a proper proof for one specific two-way protocol
was found for unconditional security in [5] and a proof
for a purified version was reported in [6]. In [5], the proof
was done for the specific case of non-entangled qubits in
one of four states coming from two mutually unbiased
bases (this protocol has been referred to as LM05 [7] and
we shall refer to it as such hereafter). In [6], a purification
of two two-way QKD protocol, namely the Super Dense
Coding scheme (SDC) and LM05 was done in order to
provide a security proof.
Unconditional security proofs provide for an informa-
tion theoretic security picture of QKD. However, a very
important fact that sets constraints within the opera-
tional context would be the issue of how such proofs are
based on asymptotic analysis that holds true only for
infinitely long keys; the concern regarding the security
nature of realistic keys, which are finitely long, becomes
evident. This has spurred a number of studies including
[8–10].
The central feature of this work is a review of the se-
curity analysis done based on protocol purifications in
[6] and a natural generalization to the the case for finite
sized keys. We begin with a quick description of two
most relevant two-way QKD protocols followed by their
purifications. After a brief on smooth entropies and its
application to deriving finite key rates, we provide finite
secure key rates in terms of efficiency for both protocols.
These will then be compared to an asymmetrical BB84.
II. TWO-WAY PROTOCOLS
The SDC protocol in some sense is closer to the earlier
instances of two-way protocols, namely the Ping-Pong
[4] and more specifically its improved version [11] which
provides for a higher protocol capacity in terms of the
number of classical bits encoded in each EM run. It is
however more resource demanding as it requires the use
of a quantum memory on Bob’s side. Our description
of SDC here follows closely that of [6]. Very simply, the
SDC protocol sees Bob sending half a Bell pair to Al-
ice (while storing the other half in a quantum memory)
for her to encode by virtue of a randomly chosen uni-
tary transformation from the set containing the identity
operator and the three Pauli operators, {I, σx, σy, σz}.
She would subsequently submit the qubit back to Bob
for measurements. Alternatively, she could measure the
received qubit in the Z basis and prepare another in the
X basis to be sent to Bob. The former process, done
with probability c ≈ 1, corresponds to her actions in
2EM, while the latter, done with probability 1 − c, cor-
responds to CM. Despite the use of 4 unitaries imply a
larger alphabet used, particularly elements of Z4 0, 1, 2, 3
mapped to I, σx, σy , σz respectively as opposed to bits for
encoding, Alice could in fact assign logical bits (in pairs)
00, 10, 11 and 01 to the unitaries. However the mapping
f : Z4 → Z22 to bits should be done only at the end of
the protocol to avoid any possibility of Eve capitalizing
on the correlation of bits given any pair [12].
Bob on the other hand would, with a probability c
make a Bell measurement and with probability 1−cmea-
sure his stored and received qubit in the Z and X basis
respectively. A protocol run which sees Bell measure-
ments by Bob coinciding with Alice’s unitary transfor-
mations would allow Bob to distinguish between Alice’s
unitaries perfectly (given that the Pauli matrices would
shift between orthogonal Bell states). Assigning logical
symbols 0, 1, 2 and 3 to the Bell states |ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |φ+〉
and |φ−〉 respectively, these instances referred to as EM
provide for sharing of a raw key between Alice and Bob.
Again, it is possible for Bob to use bits instead when
Alice submits the mapping information to Bob at the
end of the protocol runs. The instances when Alice’s
and Bob’s measurements in the Z and X bases coincides
would allow for a meaningful CM. Hence a successful EM
happens only with probability c2 and CM happens with
probability (1− c)2.
The case for a two-way QKD without using entangle-
ment, namely the LM05, sees a qubit prepared by Bob
in a particular bases randomly chosen from either the X
or Z with probabilities pX and pZ respectively to be sent
to Alice for her encoding. In the original LM05 protocol,
apart from pX = pZ , only two unitary transformation
was considered, namely the passive I and iσy. In [6], a
modification was made to include another two unitary
transformation, namely the σx and σz . The protocol was
further presented in two versions, depending on the prob-
abilities pX and pZ . In this protocol, upon executing her
unitary transformation, Alice would resubmit the qubit
to Bob who would measure in the same basis he pre-
pared in. Defining the eigenstates of σz and σx as |z±〉
and |x±〉 respectively, bit values 0 may be assigned to the
states |z+〉 or |x+〉 and 1 to the states |z−〉 or |x−〉. Bob
then adds (modulo 2) the bit value corresponding to his
prepared state (prior sending to Alice) to the bit value
corresponding to his measurement result of the state (af-
ter Alice’s encoding). We will mention shortly what Alice
needs to do in order to share bit-wise information with
Bob. This run of the protocol corresponds to a successful
EM.
With the probability 1−c, Alice would make measure-
ments of the qubit she receives instead in either the Z or
X bases for CM purposes.
Apart from the use of non entangled qubits by Bob, an-
other obvious difference with the SDC is in the possible
options in the post processing feature of the protocols.
In SDC, post processing only includes Alice’s and Bob’s
discussion to ascertain which signals were to be used for
EM and CM purposes apart from error estimations, error
corrections and privacy amplifications. In the LM05 on
the other hand, Alice and Bob have the option to commit
to either direct reconciliation (DR) or reverse reconcilia-
tion (RR) which would determine the type of information
to be disclosed over an authenticated public channel. In
the case of RR, Bob should disclose the bases he prepared
and measured qubits in. Using the same assignment of
logical bit pairs to unitary transformations as in SDC,
Alice would keep only the first bit of the pair when Bob
uses Z and the second when Bob uses X . On the other
hand, if a RR is considered, then Alice would reveal from
which of the two sets, S0 = {I, iσy} and S1 = {σx, σz}
was the transformation she had used and only the first
bit of the bit pair for each transformation is used. This
revelation is necessary given Bob’s measurement in the
X basis would give him an erroneous bit when Alice uses
S1. In these cases, Bob would need to flip his bit.
A. Purifications of Two-way Protocols
The approach to the security proof presented in [6] is
based on the notion of purification of protocols where the
protocols can be described by the measurements made by
Alice and Bob on a system provided to them by Eve [13].
Writing the measurements of Alice and Bob as Proba-
bility Operator Value Measure (POVM) maps MEMA and
MEMB respectively in EM (or M
CM
A and M
CM
B in CM),
the state after the measurements is given by
M iA ⊗M iB(ρABE) (1)
with i = EM or EM. In the purified version of both the
SDC and the LM05 as reported in [6], ρABE is a state in
the Hilbert spaceHA⊗HB⊗HE (Alice’s, Bob’s and Eve’s
respectively) and HA and HB are Hilbert spaces for two
qubit systems each. Alice’s measurement MEMA , in EM
which acts on a two qubit system must be in such a way
that it is equivalent to her encoding operation in the pro-
tocols. If we recall how in both protocols, Alice receives
a state from Bob and resends after a unitary encoding on
the state, MEMA can be understood as a (POVM) acting
on the received state with half of some entangled state so
as the other half of the entangled state (after the mea-
surement MEMA ) is the same as the output from Alices
encoding to be sent to Bob1. Thus we can imagine ρABE
as that pure state which distributes a pair of qubits to
Alice and Bob each. Alice’s measurement on the two
received qubits, trBE(ρABE) would ensure that Bob’s
measurement, MEMB on his received pair, trAE(ρABE) is
equivalent to Alice making a unitary transformation on
Bob’s prepared qubit for his subsequent decoding mea-
surement. With regards to Bob’s measurements, MEMB ,
1 This is referred to as a purification of Alice’s encoding in [6].
3it is instructive to note that in SDC, MEMB is really the
Bell measurement for decoding purposes while in LM05,
Bob’s measurement on the first half of trAE(ρABE) effec-
tively prepares the qubit state sent to Alice (in the for-
ward path) while his other measurement is on the other
half of trAE(ρABE). The measurements M
CM
A and M
CM
B
would then correspond to relevant local measurements
of each qubit in the qubit pairs in CM (detailed in the
ensuing section). Given these, the main ingredient in
the security proof for the purified protocols is based on
bounding Eve’s information gain given Bob-Alice’s us-
ing an uncertainty relation which measures the overlap
of Bob’s (Alice’s) measurement apparatus in a reverse
(direct) reconciliation scenario.
B. Measurements and Entropic Uncertainty
Relations
Entropic uncertainty relations are used in some security
proofs of particular QKD protocols given its power to
describe bounds of uncertainty parties may share of a
certain quantum system, say B. In its simplest descrip-
tion, it is simply Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in an
entropic form first proven by [14]. It was later generalized
[15–17] to include correlation of the system to be mea-
sured with disjoint (possibly quantum) systems A and E
given by
H(X |E) +H(Z|A) ≥ − log2 C, (2)
where X and Z are results from POVMs X and Z respec-
tively on B. Writing the POVM elements of X and Z as
{EXx } and {EZz } respectively, the term C is given by
C = max
x,z
∥∥∥∥
√
EXx
√
EZz
∥∥∥∥
2
∞
. (3)
Eq.(2) together with the Devatak-Winter security bound
[18] is employed in [6] to provide a security proof for the
purified SDC and LM05 protocols. In order to make use
of such an entropic relation, [6] necessarily describes the
term C as the (effective) overlap between Bob’s measuring
apparatus in a RR picture. In the purified SDC protocol,
Bob’s measurements are either the Bell measurements or
a measurement that can be described as σz ⊗ σx where
the overlap between the POVM elements as defined in
eq.(3) is 1/4. This maximal overlap is achieved when
considering the overlap between the POVM elements in
EM and that of in CM. If we let the measurements by
Alice and Bob to result in the strings SEMA and S
EM
B
respectively from EM and SCMA and S
CM
B respectively
from CM, and Eve’s system as E we can bound Eve’s
information based on eq.(2) as
H(SEMB |E) +H(SCMB |SCMA ) ≥ 2. (4)
With H(SCMB |SCMA ) upper bounded by h4(qCM) and
H(SEMB |SEMA ) by h4(qEM) where h4 is the 4-ary Shannon
entropy, qCM and qEM are errors in Alice’s and Bob’s
strings in CM and EM respectively, the key rate of the
SDC, RSDC , is given by the Devatak-Winter rate [18]
RSDC ≥ 2− h4(qCM)− h4(qEM). (5)
It is instructive to note that the errors qCM and qEM
affects a two-bit message transmission resulting from a
use of two noisy channels and thus comes as a triple;
namely error exclusively in either one channel, say qa1 and
qa2 as well as errors in both channels, q
a
3 for a = CM,EM.
Hence,
h4(qa) = −
3∑
i
qai log2 q
a
i − (1−
3∑
i
qai ) log2
(
1−
3∑
i
qai
)
.(6)
It is certainly possible to consider the entropic bounds
dictated by the overlap of Alice’s apparatus instead of
Bob’s as shown above. The key rate would remain the
same nonetheless.
A similar line of argument can be applied to the
LM05 protocol; though the measurements made for
decoding purposes by Bob would be Z = σz ⊗ σz or
X = σx ⊗ σx followed by an XOR of the the measure-
ments’ results to reveal the encoding done by Alice in
the EM. Another set of measurements, which would be
useful for the CM would be ZC = σz ⊗ I or XC = σx ⊗ I
where the maximal overlap between the POVM elements
for measurements made in EM and that in CM is 1/2.
Using the relevant entropic bounds (similar to SDC
though the overlap is now 1/2 instead of 1/4), the key
rate for LM05, RLM05 can be easily shown to be
RLM05 ≥ 1− h2(qCM)− h2(qEM), (7)
where h2 is the binary Shannon entropy and qCM and
qEM are the errors in the CM and EM respectively.
The above key rates are derived from inequalities based
on terms that are meaningful only within the infinitely
long key limits and is thus unsatisfactory from an oper-
ational and practical perspective. In the following sub-
section, we shall review briefly the notion of smooth en-
tropies and relevant entropic bounds that we shall use to
derive a finite key rate for SDC and LM05.
C. Smooth Entropies and Finite Keys
The smooth entropy is defined based on the conditional
entropy. More rigorously, following the definition given
in [20] for a bipartite state ρBE on B and E, the entropy
of B given E is defined as
Hmin(B|E) = max
ρE
sup {λ ∈ R : 2−λIB ⊗ ρE ≥ ρBE} (8)
where the maximum is taken overall states ρE in E and
IB is the identity on B. The ǫ-smooth min-entropy for
ǫ ≥ 0 is then defined as
Hǫmin(B|E) = max
ρ
Hmin(B|E). (9)
4with maximization over all bipartite states ρ on B and E
with a purified distance [21] to ρBE not exceeding ǫ. The
smooth max-entropy is defined as the dual of the smooth
min-entropy with regards to any purification of ρBE .
For the tripartite state ρABE and POVMs X and Z re-
spectively on B (resulting in bit strings X and Z), from
[20], the smooth min-entropy of X conditioned on E,
Hǫmin(X |E), gives the number of bits contained in X
that are ǫ-close2 to a uniform distribution and indepen-
dent of E. The smooth max-entropy of Z conditioned
on A, Hǫmax(Z|A), gives the number of bits needed to
reconstruct Z from A up to a probability of failure ǫ and
the generalized uncertainty relation involving smooth en-
tropies is given as [20]
Hǫmin(X |E) +Hǫmax(Z|A) ≥ − log2 C. (10)
In identifying the measurements and results in both
the SDC and LM05 with eq.(10), similar to the above,
Hǫmin(X |E) will be identified with Eve’s correlation with
Bob’s string (in EM) while Hǫmax(Z|A) is to be identified
with Alice’s and Bob’s in CM. There are two points worth
mentioning with regards to the measurements made in
CM. The first is in particular reference to LM05’s mea-
surements ZC and XC where a passive operation is noted
on the second qubit (received in the backward path).
This does not necessarily require Bob to not measure the
qubit in the backward path; rather he could just ignore
the measurement made and consider only the result of
his first measurement.3 In other words, in the cases Al-
ice note a particular round of the protocol is a CM, Bob
would ignore the result of his measurement on the sec-
ond qubit. If it was the EM, then both the measurement
results would be XOR-ed for decoding purposes.
The second point is that as the σz ⊗ σx in SDC and
ZC and XC in LM05 happens only in CM, one can see
the protocol as analogous to the asymmetrical prepare
and measure protocol of BB84 where the measurements
in EM is seen as measurements in the preferred basis in
the asymmetrical BB84. In the case for the latter, in
[10], where measurements are made in the X and Z, a
gedankenexperiment was considered where all measure-
ments were done in the Z basis to establish an uncer-
tainty relation. Following [10], in the case for the LM05,
we can use the bits derived in the CM to provide for an
estimation of the errors in the application of the uncer-
tainty relation using a similar gedankenexperiment where
all rounds are CM; and since Bob can choose to measure
for EM, security follows from the notion that the better
Alice could estimate Bob’s bits in CM, the worse would
Eve’s estimation of Bob’s bits in EM.
2 According to a distance that is based on the same notion of
purified distance, for the classical register X arising from POVM
X on B, given quantum side information E [22]
3 The results should coincide with Alice’s measurement in CM
when their bases coincide.
III. EFFICIENCY AND SECURE KEY RATES
In what follows, we shall assume implementations of the
two-way protocols using depolarizing channels. The de-
polarizing channel, D is described by the parameter q,
such that 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, which affects a quantum state, ρ
independent of the basis as such
ρ 7→ D(ρ) = (1− q)ρ+ qI/2. (11)
For two-way protocols, the use of depolarizing channels
can be categorized as either independent or correlated
channels. Such a correlation can be understood in terms
of the errors estimated in the forward and backward
paths in CM against errors in EM. Given bit wise er-
rors e1 and e2 in the forward and backward paths re-
spectively, we say the channels are independent provided
the errors in EM is given by em = e1(1− e2)+ e2(1− e1).
Otherwise they are correlated 4. While the case for inde-
pendent channels are unique by definition, the cases for
correlated channels can be infinitely many. However, we
shall only consider, as in [6] correlated channels where
e1 = e2 = em.
To ascertain a finite key rate for the two-way protocols
given such implementation, we need to determine the dis-
tribution of finite number of bits between the EM and the
CM. Choices of the value of c for both protocols would
determine this and ultimately how much of a key rate one
can have. Hence, in order to determine the optimal value
for c, assuming one has a value of k for bits in CM and
n in EM (more precisely the cases where Alice’s encod-
ing measurements coincide with Bob’s decoding measure-
ments), the total number qubits, M(n, k) sent5 before n
bits are derived from EM and k for CM estimation can
be made is given by probability value c = (
√
1 + k/n)−1.
This is immediately derived from modelling the protocol
based on [10].
Subsequently, the already mentioned gedankenexperi-
ment will provide for an uncertainty relation of eq.(10)
and the smooth-max entropy term for an n-bit string,
Z given C, Hǫmax(Z|C) would be upper bounded by
nh2(Q+ µ(n, k)) where
µ(n, k) =
√
n+ k
nk
k + 1
k
ln
2
ǫS
, (12)
with the strings Z and C derived from CM differing at
Q bits. The parameter ǫS > 0 is a security parameter as
defined in [10].
Strings shared between Alice and Bob in the EM,
which one party’s may be characterized as having er-
rors e relative to the other need be subjected to an error
4 A similar case for correlations between errors in the forward and
backward path in CM was studied in [19]
5 While for LM05 only a single qubit travels to and fro between the
communicating parties, the case for SDC makes use of entangled
pairs. Thus M(n, k) for SDC must be understood as number of
qubit pairs.
5correction procedure. This can conventionally be under-
stood as the amount of pre shared secret bits invested in
the communications for error correction purposes6.
The Leftover Hashing Lemma [23] then provides for
the length of the secret key as
L = ⌊Hǫmin(X |E) + 2 log 2ǫ⌋ , (13)
which is 2ǫ close to a bit string which is uniform and
independent of Eve’s knowledge.
The efficiency of the protocol, E can be defined based
on the amount of resources in terms of number of qubits
required,
E = L/M(n, k). (14)
It should be noted that for SDC, a factor of 2 should
be further multiplied to the denominator reflecting the
use of entangled pairs. As in [10], we do not include any
classical bits necessary in the protocol unlike [24].
A. Finite Key Analysis for SDC
We let a total of 2M(n, k) pairs of qubits travel to and
fro between Bob and Alice with the latter committing to
encoding with probability c. Thus one gets n amount of
quaternary digits from the EM. Following earlier nota-
tion, the n quaternary strings of Alice and Bob are SEMA
and SEMB respectively while the k quaternary strings de-
rived from the CM are SCMA and S
CM
B respectively. Con-
sidering a gedankenexperiment where all runs are CM lets
us bound Eve’s information on the n quaternary string
using equation (10) as
Hǫmin(S
EM
B |E) +Hǫmax(SCMB |SCMA ) ≥ 2n. (15)
The term Hǫmin(S
EM
B |E) is the smooth min-entropy of
SEMB conditioned on E. It reflects Eve’s correlation
with Bob’s string in the EM giving the number of bits
contained in SEMB that are ǫ-close to a uniform dis-
tribution and independent of E. In ascertaining the
term Hǫmax(S
CM
B |SCMA ) reflecting the correlation between
Bob’s and Alice’s strings, the case for two way channels
with depolarization q each allows us to consider bit error
rate in qubit measurements as q/2 for each channel in-
stead of a channel transmitting quaternary digits instead.
Thus in this case,
h4(q) = 2h2(q/2), (16)
for q = ((1− q/2)q/2, (q/2)(1− q/2), q2/4). The number
of bits required to reconstruct SCMB from S
CM
A (as two n
bit length strings) up to a probability of failure ǫ,
Hǫmax(S
CM
B |SCMA ) ≤ 2nh2
( q
2
+ µ(n, k)
)
, (17)
6 It is possible to consider a more practical scenario, for example
for a bit string with error rate e, a cofactor would be multiplied
to the amount bits needed for such a purpose given by h2(e).
where q/2 is the error rate for each independent depo-
larizing channel in the CM. If we write the smooth max-
entropy of Alice’s string conditioned on Bob’s in EM as
Hǫmax(S
EM
B |SEMA ) ≤ nh4(QE) with QE as errors in the
EM, then equations (13), (15) and (17) gives the key
length after error correction and privacy amplification as
LSDC ≤ n
[
2− 2h2
(q
2
+ µ(n, k)
)
− h4(QE)
]
− log 2
ǫ2S
,
(18)
where from [10], we have the term nh4(QE) as the
amount of information leaked to Eve due to error cor-
rection of the string SEMA and log (ǫ
2
S) results from the
quantum Leftover Hashing Lemma [23].
B. Finite Key Analysis for LM05
In this work, we will only focus on the first version of the
LM05 protocol where Bob’s choice for qubit preparation
and measurement in the Z bases is preferred (pZ ≈ 1)
and Alice either encodes with anyone of her transforma-
tions with probability c/4 or make measurements in the
X bases is with probability 1 − c. Furthermore, the de-
liberations ensue would be focused on the RR scenario.
Alice’s and Bob’s choice of measuring 2M(n, k) qubit
pairs in the basis X with probability 1 − c results in
ne = n +
√
nk number of bits derived from EM and k
for CM. Hence
√
nk pairs would be wasted due to bases
mismatch when Alice measures in X while Bob chooses
Z (notice that 2
√
nk qubits are wasted in [10] for similar
reasons).
Let us write the string Bob has in the EM and CM as
sEMB and s
CM
B respectively as well as Alice’s as s
EM
A and
sCMA respectively. As described above, let us consider a
gedankenexperiment where all qubits are measured using
X basis (for CM), we can therefore write an uncertainty
relation from equation (10) to bound Eve’s information
as
Hǫmin(s
EM
B |E) +Hǫmax(sCMB |sCMA ) ≥ ne. (19)
Similar to earlier discussions, the first term in the left
hand side of the above equation is the smooth min-
entropy reflecting the number of bits contained in Bob’s
string, sEMB that are ǫ-close to a uniform distribution and
independent of Eve. The second term Hǫmax(s
CM
B |sCMA )
reflects the correlation between Bob’s and Alice’s strings
and gives the number of bits needed to reconstruct sCMB
from sCMA up to a probability of failure ǫ,
Hǫmax(s
CM
B |sCMA ) ≤ neh2
(q
2
+ µ(ne, k)
)
. (20)
With Qf as the error rate in EM, noting
Hǫmax(s
EM
B |sEMA ) ≤ neh2(Qf ) and following equations
(13), (19), (20), the key length after error correction and
6privacy amplification is given by
LLM05 ≤ ne − neh2
(q
2
+ µ(ne, k)
)
−neh2(Qf )− log 2
ǫ2S
. (21)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND
COMPARISONS
In making use of the key rate formulae of equations (18)
and (21) above, we need to first assume a value for the se-
curity parameter ǫS , for which we set as 10
−10. Then, for
a given value for errors in the CM (errors in EM is then
immediately defined), setting the number forM(n, k), we
determine the value k which achieves the maximal value
for secure key length. As M(n, k) approaches infinite for
n → ∞, following [10] we could let k < K√n for some
fixed K, so that
lim
n→∞
µ(n, k) = 0, (22)
and consider secure keys within the infinite key regime.
In the infinite key regime, the efficiency for the protocols
SDC becomes
lim
n→∞
LSDC/2M(n, k) = 1− h2
(q
2
)
− h4(QE)
2
, (23)
and for LM05 we have
lim
n→∞
LLM05/M(n, k) = 1− h2
( q
2
)
− h2(Qf ). (24)
It is worth noting that the ‘additional’ term
√
nk
for amount of bits that can be derived from EM in
LM05 becomes negligible in the infinite key regime and
limn→∞
√
nk/M(n, k) = 0. Furthermore, for this con-
dition, it would be only the final term (related to error
correction) that would determine how one protocol out-
performs another.
A. Independent Channels
In Figures 1 and 2, we present the results for implemen-
tations of the SDC and LM05 for independent channels
compared to the asymmetrical BB84 in terms of protocol
efficiency against errors. In this case, the error rates for
SDC and LM05 in EM are given by 2q/2(1 − q/2) and
(2q − q2)/4 respectively [6].
We can observe that there are particular regions where
LM05 outperforms both SDC and BB84. Generally, this
can be understood when considering the competing terms
of the extra
√
nk contributing to LM05’s raw key versus
the amount of bits to be discarded due to error correc-
tion. For LM05, this is given by h2[2q/2(1−q/2)], SDC’s
h4[(2q − q2)/4]/2 while for BB84, it is simply h2(q/2)
where
h2[2q/2(1− q/2)] ≥ h4[(2q − q2)/4]/2 ≥ h2(q/2), (25)
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FIG. 1: Efficiency for Asymmetrical BB84 (blue), LM05 (red)
and SDC (green) against error rate q/2 given independent
channels for total qubit used as M = 104.
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FIG. 2: Efficiency for Asymmetrical BB84 (blue), LM05 (red)
and SDC (green) against error rate q/2 given independent
channels for total qubit used as M = 107.
with equality only at q = 0 or q = 1. The term
√
nk
is most dominant for relatively small values of n, hence
LM05’s best performance of the three in Figure 1 where
M(n, k) = 104. In the same figure we see instances when
the errors are big enough and outweighs the contribution
from
√
nk, LM05 performs poorly compared to BB84.
The error correction term for SDC is only very slightly
better than that of LM05 in the infinite key regime, ex-
plaining why it still does not exceed LM05’s
√
nk advan-
tage in the finite key scenario here. Thus LM05 exceeds
BB84 up to an error rate of about 2.7%. However, in Fig-
ure 2 where the number of qubits used, M(n, k) = 107,
LM05 exceeds BB84 only up to about 1% and SDC’s
up to 3.8%. The plot of the protocols’ efficiency against
M(n, k) for the error of 0.01 in Figure 3 exhibits the
convergence of the efficiencies as the number of qubits
used increases up to 107. These results clearly empha-
sizes LM05’s determinism over the asymmetric BB84’s.
It is worth recalling the fact that while LM05 claims de-
terministic status in terms of the absence for bases mis-
match in EM, BB84 only approximates this (in the infi-
nite key regime). Figure 4 exhibits the case for the three
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FIG. 3: Efficiency for Asymmetrical BB84 (blue), LM05 (red)
and SDC (green) against total qubit used, M (for SDC, it is
to be understood as total pairs used) for error rate 0.01. The
horizontal dashed lines represents the infinite key regime.
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FIG. 4: Efficiency for Asymmetrical BB84 (blue), LM05 (red)
and SDC (green) against error rate q/2 given independent
channels in the infinite key limit
protocols in the infinite key regime.
B. Correlated Channels
In Figures 5 and 6 we present the results for implemen-
tations of the SDC and LM05 for correlated channels
compared to the asymmetrical BB84 in terms of their ef-
ficiencies against errors in the channel. We reiterate that
we consider a particular model for correlated channels;
i.e. specified by e1 = e2 = em and the error rates for
SDC and LM05 in EM are given by q/2 and q/4 respec-
tively [6].
In both the figures we see LM05 outperforming BB84
though in the second only marginally. This can be under-
stood as due to going to infinite key limit where the two
efficiencies should converge (binary entropic function for
the bits to be discarded for both protocols in correlated
channels is essentially given by the same form). This is
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FIG. 5: Efficiency for Asymmetrical BB84 (blue), LM05 (red)
and SDC (green) against error rate q/2 for total qubit used as
M = 104 for correlated channels specified by e1 = e2 = em.
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FIG. 6: Efficiency for Asymmetrical BB84 (blue), LM05 (red)
and SDC (green) against error rate q/2 for total qubit used as
M = 107 for correlated channels specified by e1 = e2 = em.
illustrated in Figure (7) for increasing qubits used and
further highlighted in Figure (8) where the black curve
represents both the LM05 and BB84’s key rate. However
what is interesting is the fact that for finite number of
qubits used, LM05 exceeds BB84 in terms of a higher tol-
erance towards errors clearly exemplified in Figure (5).
This is almost unexpected as looking at the key rate for-
mulas, one would imagine that the amount of bits to be
discarded due to error correction and privacy amplifica-
tion are essentially the same (relative to the key rates).
However, a difference exists when considering the statisti-
cal fluctuation term. As LM05 allows for a larger number
of bits to be salvaged in EM, thus a greater number of
bits in CM (compared to BB84) may be used for error
estimation in bounding Eve’s information in the entropic
relation. This allows for µ(ne, ke) < µ(n, k) implying
h2
(q
2
+ µ(n, k)
)
> h2
(q
2
+ µ(ne, ke)
)
. (26)
Hence, for the same error in a channel, BB84 discards
more bits than LM05, explaining LM05’s higher error
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FIG. 7: Efficiency for Asymmetrical BB84 (blue), LM05 (red)
and SDC (green) against total qubit used, M (for SDC, it is
to be understood as total pairs used) for error rate 0.01 for
correlated channels specified by e1 = e2 = em. The horizontal
dashed lines represents the infinite key regime.
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FIG. 8: Efficiency for Asymmetrical BB84, LM05 (both
black) and SDC (green) against error rate q/2 for correlated
channels specified by e1 = e2 = em in the infinite key limit.
tolerance. This would be essentially the same reasoning
for LM05’s performance over SDC’s in figure 4.
SDC’s better performance when compared to BB84’s
in both figures and LM05’s in figure 5 is mainly due to
the error correction term. In this particular model for
correlated channels, the following inequality holds,
h2(q/2) ≥ h4(q/4), (27)
where less bits are discarded for error correction in SDC
and equality holds only for q = 0. The infinite key regime
of Figure (6) sees identical performance for both LM05
and BB84 while SDC exceeds both.
V. CONCLUSION
Protocols making use of bidirectional quantum channels
like the ones described in this work have the interesting
feature of encodings being embedded in a unitary trans-
formation as opposed to the preparation of a quantum
state as well as the added advantage of how a decoding
procedure should not see wastage due to bases mismatch
unlike the conventional BB84. By conventional we re-
fer to the BB84 in its original form where the choice
of bases is equiprobable, resulting in only half of qubits
transmitted could be used as a raw key. While asymmet-
ric BB84 is proposed as a remedy and is expected to not
perform any less than the two ‘deterministic’ protocols
in the infinite key regime, the scenario for finite keys can
be different; thus the motivation for this work.
Noting how the choice of relevant probability distri-
bution for EM and CM is immediately analogous to the
asymmetric BB84’s choice for the preferred basis and non
preferred basis respectively in [10], we extend the security
proof based on purified versions of the SDC and LM05 in
[6] to the use of smooth entropies for a finite key analysis.
We provide for secure key rates in terms of efficiency for
the protocols.
In relatively small number of qubits resources used (or-
der of 104) as well as lower depolarization of channels,
we observe an obvious advantage in LM05 due to having
more bits for raw key purpose (derived from EM). This
results from LM05’s encoding/ decoding process which
is independent of Bob’s choice of bases for measurement
processes; which is in fact the ‘deterministic’ merit claim
of the protocol. This advantage does however diminish
in the region of asymptotically long keys when compared
to BB84 (as well as the SDC).
The SDC is in some sense very similar to the asymmet-
ric BB84 as bits for key purposes can only be salvaged
when both Alice’s and Bob’s encoding and decoding pro-
cesses respectively coincide (unlike LM05 where Bob’s
measurements in CM would be equally meaningful as a
decoding measurement in the EM). The only real advan-
tage SDC has over BB84 would be in the correlated chan-
nels case due to the error correction procedure. However,
one must bear in mind that while efficiency for LM05
and BB84 is measured as key bits per-qubits transmitted,
SDC’s is measured as key bits per-entangled pairs used.
Practically, this may not set to provide for a promising
scenario as quantum memories become a necessity.
We conclude saying that a finite key analysis would be
enlightening also for two-way QKD in the framework of
continuous variable [3].
VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The authors would like to thank N. Beaudry, S. Karu-
manchi and M. Lucamarini for fruitful discussions. J.
S. Shaari would also like to thank the University of
Camerino for kind hospitality as well as the ICEO, IIUM
for financial support.
9[1] M. Lucamarini, and S. Mancini, Th. Comp. Sci. 560, 46
(2014).
[2] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev.
Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
[3] S. Pirandola, S. Mancini, S. Lloyd and S. L. Braunstein,
Nat. Phys. 4, 726 (2008)
[4] K. Bostro¨m, and T. Felbinger, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89,
187902 (2002).
[5] H. Lu,C.-H. F. Fung, X. Ma, and Q.-Y. Cai, Phys. Rev.
A 84, 042344 (2011).
[6] N. J. Beaudry, M. Lucamarini, S. Mancini, and R. Ren-
ner, Phys. Rev. A 88, 062302 (2013).
[7] M. Lucamarini, and S. Mancini, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94,
140501 (2005).
[8] M. Hayashi, Phys. Rev. A 74, 022307 (2006).
[9] V. Scarani, and R. Renner, Phys. Rev. Lett. 100, 200501
(2008).
[10] M. Tomamichel, C. C. W. Lim, N. Gisin and R. Renner,
Nat. Comm. 3, 634 (2012).
[11] Q.-Y. Cai, and B.-W. Li, Phys. Rev. A 69, 054301 (2004).
[12] H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, and W. Tittel, Phys. Rev. A
61, 062308 (2000).
[13] H. K. Lo, H. F. Chau, Science 283, 5410 (1999)
[14] H. Maassen, and J. B. M. Uffink, Phys. Rev. Lett. 60,
1103 (1988).
[15] J. M. Renes and J. C. Boileau, Phys. Rev. Lett., 103,
020402 (2009).
[16] M. Berta, M. Christandl, R. Colbeck, J. M. Renes, and
R. Renner, Nat. Phys., 6, 659 (2010).
[17] P. J. Coles, L. Yu, V. Gheorghiu, and R. B. Griffiths
(2010), arXiv: 1006.4859.
[18] I. Devetak and A. Winter, Proc. R. Soc. A 461, 207
(2005).
[19] J. S. Shaari, M. Lucamarini, and S. Mancini Quantum
Inf. Process. 13, 1139 (2014).
[20] M. Tomamichel, and R. Renner, Phys. Rev. Lett. 106,
110506 (2011).
[21] M. Tomamichel, R. Colbeck, and R. Renner, IEEE Trans.
Inf. Th., 56, 4674 (2010).
[22] M. Tomamichel, PhD Thesis, Diss. ETH No. 20213,
arXiv:1203.2142v2 [quant-ph] (2013)
[23] M. Tomamichel, Christian Schaffner, Adam Smith, and
Renato Renner, IEEE Trans. Inf. Th., 57,8, 5524, (2011)
[24] A. Cabello, Rec. Res. Dev. Phys. 2, 249 (2001).
